University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law

DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law
Endnotes

4-1-2015

"The Hindrance of a Law Degree": Justice Kagan on
Law and Experience
Laura Krugman Ray

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/endnotes
Part of the Law and Philosophy Commons, Legal Profession Commons, and the Legal Writing
and Research Commons
Recommended Citation
74 Md. L. Rev. Endnotes 10 (2015)

This Articles from Volume 74 is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Endnotes by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

“THE HINDRANCE OF A LAW DEGREE”: JUSTICE KAGAN ON
LAW AND EXPERIENCE
LAURA KRUGMAN RAY ∗
Elena Kagan, the current United States Supreme Court’s newest
Justice, has also proven to be its most innovative writer. In place of the
usually dry and formal prose that readers of the Court’s opinions have long
encountered (with Justice Scalia’s vigorous dissents and Chief Justice
Roberts’s urbane observations the rare exceptions), she consistently leavens
her judicial prose with an assortment of rhetorical devices. Her arsenal
includes colloquial diction, direct invitations to the reader to participate in
her analytic process, and vivid metaphors that link legal argument to the
experience of everyday life. That stylistic approach is not merely
decorative or playful. It is intended to bridge the gap between authoring
Justice and lay reader, a strategy that Kagan has explicitly embraced. In a
recent interview she said of her opinion writing that she “tr[ies] very hard to
make it understandable to a broad audience.”1 And “one of the ways” of
reaching that audience is “to drop the legalese” and “try to express things in
the way people would express it in normal conversation.” 2
I have elsewhere written in detail about what I have called Kagan’s
“doctrinal conversation,” her determined effort through these devices to
make her opinions accessible and persuasive to readers unfamiliar with the
language of the law.3 In this article I go a step further and argue that
Kagan’s rhetoric also suggests a more subversive position: that legal
doctrine should, at its core, be grounded in the texture of common
experience and understandable through the same lens that non-lawyers use
to assess questions of responsibility and fairness. The Court’s holdings, in
short, should make sense to lawyers and non-lawyers alike. If those
holdings cannot be expressed persuasively in terms that non-lawyers can
© 2015 Laura Krugman Ray.
∗
Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law, Ph.D., J.D., Yale University; A.B.,
Bryn Mawr College. I am grateful to Jean Eggen, Alan Garfield, and Philip Ray for their helpful
readings of earlier drafts of this article.
1. Interview by Wendy Collins Purdue, Dean, University of Richmond School of Law with
Justice Elena Kagan, Richmond, Va. (Sept. 20, 2012), http://www.c-span.org/video/?3082911/conversation-supreme-court-justice-elena-kagan.
2. Id.
3. Laura Krugman Ray, Doctrinal Conversation: Elena Kagan’s Supreme Court Opinions,
89 IND. L.J. SUPP. 1 (2013).
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appreciate, then perhaps they should not persuade the Justices who have
been too quick to endorse them.
One of the most striking aspects of Kagan’s opinions is her insistence
on prompting the reader to play an active role in reading the text rather than
passively accepting a Justice’s expert analysis, even when that analysis is
Kagan’s own. She may invite her reader simply to “consider” 4 an element
of the case under review or challenge that reader to “suppose” 5 or
“pretend” 6 or “imagine” 7 a variant of the accepted version of the case in
order to reach a different outcome. More assertively, she may tell the
reader to “put on blinders” and then “take off those blinders”8 in order to
grasp the full implications of a statutory subsection or instead to put two
statutory sections “together—say, in the form of a syllogism, to make the
point obvious.” 9 Sympathizing with the reader’s exertion in the latter case,
she offers the reassurance that “[i]f you need to take a deep breath after all
that, you’re not alone.” 10 This is a shared activity, one that makes the
reader a silent partner in the decisionmaking process and prepares him to
reject the other side’s tortuous argument. When Kagan, writing for the
Court, concludes that “[i]t would be hard to dream up a more roundabout
way of bifurcating judicial review,” the reader, whether lawyer or lay
person, may well share the satisfaction of having earned a stake in that
conclusion. 11
Kagan’s occasional use of metaphor and simile serves a related role of
engagement, allowing the lay reader to analogize a legal issue to familiar
experience. In Fox v. Vice, 12 the Court faced the complicated question of
when a defendant may recover fees under Section 1988 for expenses
incurred defending against a civil rights suit raising both frivolous and nonfrivolous claims. 13 Explaining why the statutory language alone fails to
provide courts with clear-cut standards, Kagan offers a familiar simile:
These standards would be easy to apply if life were like the
movies, but that is usually not the case. In Hollywood, litigation
most often concludes with a dramatic verdict that leaves one party
fully triumphant and the other utterly prostrate. The court in such
4. Nat’l Meat Ass’n v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 965, 970 (2012).
5. Match-E-Be-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2205 (2012).
6. Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2838 (2010) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting).
7. Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2290 (2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 2293 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
9. Kloeckner v. Solis, 133 S. Ct. 596, 604 (2012).
10. Id. at 605.
11. Id.
12. 131 S. Ct. 2205 (2011).
13. Id. at 2211.
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a case would know exactly how to award fees (even if that anticlimactic scene is generally left on the cutting-room floor). But
in the real world, litigation is more complex, involving multiple
claims for relief that implicate a mix of legal theories and have
different merits. . . . In short, litigation is messy, and courts must
deal with this untidiness in awarding fees. 14
For the reader familiar with litigation only through the Hollywood version,
the analogy serves as both a friendly introduction to the complexity of civil
rights cases and a serious caution that courts have to deal with a far messier
reality than filmmakers, who can simply delete unwieldy complications.
Although that reality may not lend itself to the simplified approach of
fictional courts, Kagan suggests that the problem, if not the solution, is still
understandable by non-lawyers.
In Judulang v. Holder, 15 a case involving the disparate standards for
providing waiver rights to excludable and deportable aliens under a federal
statutory scheme, the Court confronted an even messier case, and Kagan
finds an even more flexible analogy to illustrate the basis for its holding.
Observing that eligibility for a waiver depended on “the chance
correspondence” of two statutory schemes, she underscores the irrational
quality of the challenged test by comparing it to another common
experience: the coin toss. 16 If, she notes, the Board of Immigration Appeals
had itself chosen the coin toss as its method of deciding which aliens could
apply for a waiver—“heads an alien may apply for relief, tails he may
not”—the Court wouldn’t hesitate to strike it down as arbitrary. 17
Extending her analogy to counter some of the government’s arguments in
defense of its approach, she rejects the argument based on its “vintage,”
noting that “flipping coins to determine Section 212(c) eligibility would
remain as arbitrary on the thousandth try as on the first.” 18 Rejecting as
well the government’s economic defense of its position, she notes that
“cheapness alone cannot validate an arbitrary agency policy. (If it could,
flipping coins would be a valid way to determine an alien’s eligibility for a
waiver.)” 19 These refinements of the original image provide a sustained
visual analogy for the Court’s rejection of the government’s argument, one
that non-lawyers can grasp without mastering the complicated statutory
framework.

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 2213–14.
132 S. Ct. 476 (2011).
Id. at 484.
Id. at 485.
Id. at 488.
Id. at 490.
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Kagan has used a similar strategy in several other cases. Dissenting
from a rape conviction, she has argued that the Confrontation Clause
requires the direct testimony of the technician who produced the DNA
profile linking the defendant to the crime, and thus the bare testimony of an
analyst about the implications of that profile is insufficient. 20 “If the
Confrontation Clause prevents the State from getting its evidence in
through the front door,” she insists, “then the State could sneak it in through
the back. What a neat trick—but really, what a way to run a criminal
justice system.” 21 The front door or back door imagery, supported by the
unwholesome implications of “sneak” and “trick,” brands the majority’s
holding as an evasive ruse that even a lay reader can detect. Writing for the
Court to reverse an enhanced sentence based on an incorrect reading of the
relevant statute, Kagan notes that the lower court erred in viewing the crime
“as containing an infinite number of sub-crimes corresponding to ‘all the
possible ways an individual can commit’ it.” 22 To illustrate her point, she
then offers, in an aside, a helpfully exaggerated analogy based on Clue, a
board game familiar to both lay and legal readers: “(Think: Professor Plum,
in the ballroom, with the candlestick?
Colonel Mustard, in the
conservatory, with the rope, on a snowy day, to cover up his affair with
Mrs. Peacock?).” 23 The evocation of a childhood pastime in the sentencing
context signals that the lower court’s unreasonably expansive interpretation
is itself a misguided judicial game rather than a thoughtful reading of the
statute. And in a recent dissent taking the majority to task for an
interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act that forecloses any avenue to
relief for the petitioners’ antitrust claim, Kagan concludes her opinion with
another vivid metaphor. “To a hammer,” she writes, “everything looks like
a nail.” 24 The majority’s position is thus a blunt instrument applied without
sufficient discrimination to reach a target unintended by the statutory
scheme. Her image is brief and pithy, an efficient and effective way to
make her point.
As the recent case of Florida v. Jardines 25 demonstrates, however, for
Kagan an analogy can serve as something more than a single vivid image.
At issue in Jardines was whether the detection of marijuana by a trained
police dog from the porch of a private home is a search under the Fourth
Amendment. Kagan opens her concurring opinion by announcing that

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2272.
Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2290–91 (2013).
Id. at 2291.
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2320 (2013).
133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).
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“[f]or me, a simple analogy clinches this case.” 26 She then presents that
analogy, a detailed scenario that parallels Jardines’s facts:
A stranger comes to the front door of your home carrying
super-high-powered binoculars. . . . He doesn’t knock or say
hello. Instead, he stands on the porch and uses the binoculars to
peer through your windows, into your home’s furthest corners. It
doesn’t take long (the binoculars are really very fine): In just a
couple of minutes, his uncommon behavior allows him to learn
details of your life you disclose to no one. Has your visitor
trespassed on your property, exceeding the license you have
granted to members of the public to, say, drop off the mail or
distribute campaign flyers? Yes, he has.27
The police dog, like the binoculars, is “a super-sensitive instrument,” and
the fact that the instrument is “animal, not mineral” in no way undermines
the analogy. 28 Expanding the comparison, she adds that highly trained
police dogs “are to the poodle down the street as high-powered binoculars
are to a piece of plain glass.” 29 Kagan bases her argument squarely—and
entirely—on her invented scenario and its relation to the facts before the
Court. “That case,” she assures the reader, “is this case in every way that
matters.” 30
Kagan’s reliance on analogical reasoning is scarcely surprising, since
it bears some relation to her stated preference for the familiar over the
novel. She makes that point expressly in Martel v. Clair,31 where the Court
was asked to adopt a tougher standard for substitution of new counsel in a
criminal case.32 In light of the State’s concession that its proposed test
came, as Kagan puts it, “well, from nowhere,” she declines to venture into
new territory. 33 “Inventiveness is often an admirable quality,” she muses,
“but here we think the State overdoes it. . . . [We] prefer to copy something
familiar than concoct something novel.” 34 The verb “concoct” efficiently
conveys her skepticism toward unnecessarily creative legal arguments
where reliable doctrine exists. In a similar spirit, she joins Justice Scalia’s
majority opinion in Jardines, which relied on the police intent to conduct a
search of the defendant’s home, but writes separately to ground her
argument as well in the realm of familiar human (and canine) experience.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 1418.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
132 S. Ct. 1276 (2012).
Martel v. Clair, 132 S. Ct. 1276 (2012).
Id. at 1285.
Id.
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That reliance on familiar experience is a recurring theme in Kagan’s
opinions. In Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn,
Kagan dissented from the Court’s decision rejecting on standing grounds an
Establishment Clause challenge to a law allowing taxpayers making
voluntary contributions to a religious school to receive a state income tax
credit. 35 In support of her view that Flast v. Cohen 36 clearly provided
standing for the challenge, she offers what she terms “an example far afield
from Flast.” 37 In her scenario, one with a familiar ring, the government
decides to provide insolvent banks with hundreds of billions of dollars, and
many taxpayers object strenuously:
In the face of this hostility, some Members of Congress make the
following proposal: Rather than give the money to banks via
appropriations, the Government will allow banks to subtract the
exact same amount from the tax bill they would otherwise have to
pay to the U.S. Treasury. Would this proposal calm the furor?
Or would most taxpayers respond by saying that a subsidy is a
subsidy (or a bailout is a bailout), whether accomplished by the
one means or by the other? Surely the latter; indeed, we would
think the less of our countrymen if they failed to see through this
cynical proposal. 38
The protesting taxpayers would have no difficulty seeing through the
alternate proposal and, Kagan suggests, neither should the Court on the
facts before it. “What ordinary people would appreciate,” she continues,
“this Court’s case law also recognizes.” She explains how this is so by
citing precedent for the view that “targeted tax breaks are often
economically and functionally indistinguishable from a direct monetary
subsidy.” 39 The common sense attributed to “ordinary people,” who would
need no knowledge of legal precedent to see the right response to the statute
at issue, here helps to trump the majority’s holding.
Kagan’s endorsement of common experience over legal expertise as an
interpretive tool manifests itself in a number of ways. Applying a federal
railroad statute, she is unmoved when “Alabama dresses up” its legal
argument “in Latin” by relying on the interpretive canon ejusdem generis.40
She finds instead that “the better version of Alabama’s claim reads entirely
in English” and is much more persuasive. 41 And, interpreting a criminal
flight statute, she observes that the Court does not “proceed by exploring
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011).
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
Ariz. Christian School Tuition Org., 131 S. Ct. at 1455 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1455–56.
Id. at 1456.
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Ala. Dep’t of Revenue, 131 S. Ct. 1101, 1113 (2011).
Id.
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whether some platonic form of an offense—here, some abstract notion of
vehicular flight—satisfies ACCA’s residual clause. We instead focus on
the elements of the actual state statute at issue.”42
Not surprisingly, Kagan’s approach leads her to formulate her legal
arguments in terms accessible to both her legal and lay readers. In Williams
v. Illinois, 43 the Confrontation Clause case discussed earlier, the issue was
whether an expert witness should be permitted to testify about the
implications of the defendant’s DNA profile when the technician who had
created the profile did not take the stand. Addressing that issue in her
dissent, Kagan asks her readers to “[c]onsider a prosaic example not
involving scientific evidence”: 44
An eyewitness tells a police officer investigating an assault that
the perpetrator had an unusual, star-shaped birthmark over his left
eye. The officer arrests a person bearing that birthmark (let’s call
him Starr) for committing the offense. And at trial, the officer
takes the stand and recounts just what the eyewitness told him.
Presumably the plurality would agree that such testimony violates
the Confrontation Clause unless the eyewitness is unavailable and
the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine him. Now
ask whether anything changes if the officer couches his testimony
in the following way: “I concluded that Starr was the assailant
because a reliable witness told me that the assailant had a starshaped birthmark and, look, Starr has one just like that.” 45
Justice Alito, writing for the Williams majority, held that the expert’s
testimony about the DNA profile was offered “solely for the purpose of
explaining the assumptions on which” her own opinion rested and should
“thus fall outside the scope of the Confrontation Clause.” 46 By translating
the subject of the testimony from the specialized knowledge of the two
analysts to the conversation of a police officer with a witness, Kagan
reframes the issue. In her version, the police officer is clearly relying on
what he has heard from the absent witness, and thus his testimony should be
precluded. The “prosaic example” suggests that the majority has been led
astray by the scientific window dressing of the testimony and has failed to
focus on the substance of the exchange. “Allowing the admission of this
evidence,” Kagan concludes, “would end-run the Confrontation Clause, and
make a parody of its strictures.” 47

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2289 (2011).
132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012).
Id. at 2269 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 2228 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2269 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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In light of her preference for accessible arguments, it should be no
surprise that Kagan prefers to root her opinions in concrete situations rather
than theoretical abstractions. She is skeptical of assumptions that “would
have no real-world meaning or application” and would “serve[] only to
address a make-believe problem.” 48 Criticizing the majority for basing its
interpretation of the Fair Labor Standards Act on a mistaken view of the
law, she plays out the consequences. “The decision,” she argues, “would
turn out to be the most one-off of one-offs,” and she advises her readers to
act accordingly. 49 “Feel free,” she instructs, “to relegate the majority’s
decision to the furthest reaches of your mind: The situation it addresses
should never again arise.” 50
Kagan prefers to derive her own assumptions from ordinary and
recurring experience. When she asks her readers to “assume” that a
defendant has given up his right to trial by pleading guilty to a lesser
offense, she adds parenthetically “(as happens every day)” to reassure them
that this is a commonplace event. 51 And although “a court blessed with
sufficient time and imagination could devise a laundry list of potential
‘weapons’” not included in the applicable sentencing statute, such
imaginative additions are not relevant to the case.52 “But the thing about
hypothetical lists,” she observes dryly, “is that they are, well,
hypothetical.” 53 When she offers her own hypothetical list of the various
ways in which a landowner could pay an obligation imposed by a
government water district—”a checking account, shares of stock, a wealthy
uncle”—the options are both familiar and whimsical. 54 Unlike the
hypothetical weapons list, which would depart from the statutory
framework, Kagan’s list is presented purely to illustrate her point that the
landowner was not required to meet his obligation by surrendering part of
his property.
A recent opinion illustrates her method of engaging the lay reader
directly in the Court’s decisionmaking process by drawing on familiar
human experiences. In Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo
Nordisk, 55 the outcome depended on the meaning of the common phrase

48. Genesis Healthcare Corporation v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523, 1533, 1535 (2013) (Kagan,
J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 1533.
50. Id.
51. Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2289 (2013).
52. Id. at 2290.
53. Id.
54. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2607 (2013) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting).
55. Caraco Pharm. Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct. 1670 (2012).
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“not an.” 56 When Novo sued Caraco, the manufacturer of a generic drug
that would compete with Novo’s own product, for infringement of its
patent, Caraco in turn counterclaimed. The relevant statute authorizes a
counterclaim “on the ground that the patent does not claim . . . an approved
method of using the drug.” 57 The question before the Court was whether the
statutory language “not an” meant, as Novo argued, “not any” or, as Caraco
argued, meant “not a particular one.” 58 Addressing this interpretational
dilemma, Kagan writing for the Court decided that the answer was “‘It
depends.’” 59 To explain why, under the statute’s language, Caraco should
prevail, she offers an extended illustration of the way context determines
meaning:
If your spouse tells you he is late because he “did not take a cab,”
you will infer that he took no cab at all (but took the bus instead).
If your child admits that she “did not read a book all summer,”
you will surmise that she did not read any book (but went to the
movies a lot). And if a sports-fan friend bemoans that “the New
York Mets do not have a chance of winning the World Series,”
you will gather that the team has no chance whatsoever (because
they have no hitting). But now stop a moment. Suppose your
spouse tells you that he got lost because “he did not make a turn.”
You would understand that he failed to make a particular turn, not
that he drove from the outset in a straight line. Suppose your
child explains her mediocre grade on a college exam by saying
that she “did not read an assigned text.” You would infer that she
failed to read a specific book, not that she read nothing at all on
the syllabus. And suppose that a lawyer friend laments that in her
last trial, she “did not prove an element of the offense.” You
would grasp that she is speaking not of all the elements, but of a
particular one. The examples could go on and on, but the point is
simple enough: When it comes to the meaning of “not an,”
context matters. 60
In this passage Kagan asks the reader to consider a series of ordinary
conversations with a spouse, a child, or a friend, confident that in each
instance the reader will interpret those conversations in the same way that
the Court is interpreting the statute’s text. No legal expertise is required to
grasp the point; in fact, the absence of legal expertise, Kagan suggests,
helps to clarify why the Court should answer as it does and accept Caraco’s
argument. The passage bridges two varieties of speech—personal and

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 1680–81.
Id.
Id. at 1681.
Id.
Id.
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technical—to resolve a disputed provision by accepting “the most natural
reading of a statute.” 61
Kagan uses a variant of the same strategy in American Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Restaurant, 62 where she dissents from the Court’s decision
enforcing an arbitration provision barring a restaurant owner from pursuing
his antitrust claim. 63 She opens her opinion with what she terms “a nutshell
version of the case, unfortunately obscured in the Court’s decision”
effectively insulating Amex from any antitrust liability. 64 She then adds
“the nutshell version of today’s opinion, admirably flaunted rather than
camouflaged: Too darn bad”; that is, there is no recourse available for the
Those “nutshell” versions suggest that even a reader
plaintiff. 65
unacquainted with the complicated doctrines of antitrust law should be able
to grasp the basic unfairness of the majority decision. After setting out the
Court’s precedents, she offers the reader a clearly defined choice between
her position and the majority’s: “So down one road: More arbitration, better
enforcement of federal statutes. And down the other: Less arbitration,
poorer enforcement of federal statutes. Which would you prefer? Or still
more aptly: Which do you think Congress would?” 66 The reader is now
pressed into service as a surrogate decisionmaker, first asked to choose his
preferred outcome and then, more challengingly, to choose the outcome that
Congress, in passing the statute, would prefer. The doctrinal intricacies of
the case are transformed to a clear-cut choice between protecting Amex and
protecting the small business owner.
And the reader, now the
decisionmaker, has been led inevitably to the common sense conclusion that
the Court has rejected.
Kagan’s reliance on ordinary experience as a valid basis for legal
analysis is a recurring theme in her opinions. In a second case dealing with
a police dog’s detection of drugs, this time in the defendant’s automobile,
she defines the probable cause standard as “whether all the facts
surrounding a dog’s alert, viewed through the lens of common sense, would
make a reasonably prudent person think that a search would reveal
contraband or evidence of a crime.” 67 In this case, there is substantial
evidence of the dog Aldo’s training and prior success in the detection of
drugs. Since “[a] sniff is up to snuff when it meets” the probable cause test,

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 1682.
133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
Id. at 2312.
Id. at 2313.
Id.
Id. at 2315.
Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1058 (2013).
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“Aldo’s did.” 68 In her Williams dissent she complains that neither Justice
Alito’s plurality opinion nor Justice Breyer’s concurrence on the damaging
impact of requiring the DNA analyst to testify “provides any evidence, even
by way of anecdote,” suggesting that she would have been receptive to the
latter commonplace source.69 And writing for the majority in a case dealing
with public access to the Navy’s maps of explosives, she rejects the
argument that those maps fall within the category of protected personnel
files because “[n]o one staring at these charts of explosions and using
ordinary language would describe them in this manner.” 70 Once again, the
lay person’s perspective is a valid basis for resolving a legal question.
Perhaps Kagan’s strongest endorsement of the ordinary person’s
ability to assess and resolve legal issues comes in Arizona Free Enterprise
Club Freedom PAC v. Bennett, 71 where the Court struck down Arizona’s
campaign finance matching fund provision as a burden on political speech
under the First Amendment. 72 Under that provision, the candidate choosing
to accept public financing first receives a lump-sum payment from the state.
Thereafter, “for every dollar his privately funded opponent (or the
opponent’s supporters) spends over the initial subsidy, the publicly funded
candidate will—to a point—get an additional 94 cents.” 73 His public
funding is capped at three times the initial lump sum, however much money
his privately funded rival spends. Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a fiveJustice majority, found that the state’s “cash subsidy, conferred in response
to political speech, penalizes speech” by the privately funded candidate.74
In sharp contrast, Kagan’s dissent, joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, and Sotomayor, finds that, far from burdening speech, the Arizona
law has created what she calls “the Goldilocks solution, which produces the
‘just right’ grant to ensure that a participant in the system has the funds
needed to run a competitive race.” 75 The fairy tale reference suggests that
the law has a kind of childlike simplicity in its determination to treat all
competing candidates fairly. “Except in a world gone topsy-turvy,” she
argues, “additional campaign speech and electoral competition is not a First
Amendment injury.” 76 The petitioners attacking the statute “are making a
novel argument that Arizona violated their First Amendment rights by
disbursing funds to other speakers even though they could have received
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2275 n.6 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Milner v. Department of the Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259, 1269 (2011).
131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011).
Id. at 2828–2829 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2832.
Id. at 2821.
Id. at 2832.
Id. at 2833.
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(but chose to spurn) the same financial assistance.” 77 In an appeal to the
non-legal universe, she observes that “[s]ome people might call that
chutzpah.” 78
Placing herself squarely among those people, she offers her strongest
endorsement of the lay person’s ability to reject legal subterfuge and reach
the heart of the matter: “If an ordinary citizen, without the hindrance of a
law degree, thought this result an upending of First Amendment values, he
would be correct.” 79 It is the legal blinders worn by the majority that
prevent its members, all apparently hindered by their law degrees, from
seeing the simple fairness of Arizona’s solution. Turning directly to those
perceptive ordinary citizens, she offers them a choice of campaign finance
approaches:
Pretend you are financing your campaign through private
donations. Would you prefer that your opponent receive a
guaranteed, upfront payment of $150,000, or that he receive only
$50,000, with the possibility—a possibility that you mostly get to
control—of collecting another $100,000 somewhere down the
road? Me too. 80
In Kagan’s scenario, the non-lawyers once again have penetrated the legal
fog to see what the members of the majority have missed—that Arizona’s
plan actually gives the privately funded candidate some control over how
much money his opponent receives. When Kagan joins in the conversation
with her “Me too” response, she is taking her place among the
commonsensical lay people who grasp the way the campaign finance law
will actually operate.
Kagan is not the first member of the Court to appreciate the
importance of communicating directly with lay readers as well as lawyers.
Chief Justice Warren specifically instructed the clerk assigned to draft the
Court’s opinion in Brown v. Board of Education 81 to produce a text that
would be “readable by the lay public.” 82 And Hugo Black instructed his
law clerk that an opinion should be written so that “‘your momma’” could
understand it. 83 Justice Kagan is, however, the first Justice to adopt that
perspective as a central element of her jurisprudence, not only in the
language she uses but, more fundamentally, in the way she crafts her
arguments. Since the law is grounded in human experience, she suggests,
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 2835.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2838.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
BERNARD SCHWARZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT—A
JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 97 (1983).
83. ROGER NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK 325 (1994).
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the Court’s decisions, properly expressed, should reach and persuade both
the lay and legal communities. And, in her brief tenure on the Court, she
has crafted a jurisprudential voice that speaks to both.

